Antonio Llidó, un sacerdote revolucionario (Spanish Edition)

Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online Antonio Llidó, un sacerdote revolucionario (Spanish Edition) file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with Antonio Llidó, un sacerdote revolucionario (Spanish Edition) book. Happy reading Antonio Llidó, un sacerdote revolucionario (Spanish Edition) Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF Antonio Llidó, un sacerdote revolucionario (Spanish Edition) at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF Antonio Llidó, un sacerdote revolucionario (Spanish Edition) Pocket Guide.

At the same time, the Unidad Popular became a kind of utopia. Still, solidarity was not only imagined or constructed; it also took concrete shape and had tangible results. Indeed, people in Europe did not sit idly by watching television screens, listening to the radio, and reading newspapers reports on the situation in the Chile. Many sprang into action. The groundswell of opprobrium drawn by the violence in Chile mustered thousands of people in demonstrations in capitals and smaller cities all over Western and Eastern Europe.

It also provoked a dynamic escalation of activism that claimed solidarity with the victims of the coup and staged relief for the tens of thousands Chileans fleeing repression. Moreover, the attention to Chile was not a momentary matter of political correctness. Images of the dark spectacled general Pinochet and his defeated enemy Allende entered the public memory and imaginary of generations of European citizens and the textbooks of history in schools.

And as several contributions to this volume demonstrate, Chilean exiles, who had been received by European societies in their thousands, were of paramount importance in shaping the nature and outlook of activism at the local, national, and transnational level in Western and Eastern Europe. Almost immediately after the coup, political and trade union leaders of the crushed Unidad Popular quickly rebuilt their organizations banned by the dictatorship all over Europe. After , European capitals like Brussels, East Berlin, Paris, and Rome became host to the main exile centers of the Chilean opposition with a global reach.

Through its chapters across the world it played an important role in fuelling and orienting activists. Many of the public campaigns against Pinochet in Western and Eastern Europe featured the central presence of members of the family of the late president Allende, such as his widow Hortensia and his daughters Isabel and Beatriz, who toured as representatives of the Unidad Popular in exile across the world. They toured to gather support and to spread the message of resistance among governments, solidarity committees, and varying types of NGOs.

Notably upsetting the narrative of human rights campaigns for Chile as a matter for Western NGOs, this volume shows that Chilean exiles of the Unidad Popular parties were keen to embrace the language of human rights in order to sell their message abroad. The committee sought to unite politicians, worshippers, and intellectuals from various ideological provenances in the denunciation of torture and repression of political prisoners in Chile.

They centered on action at the level of international bodies of the UN and contributed to a subtle merger of political loyalties and solidarities with human rights. Hence, rather than being a unilateral effort by Western activists, as averred by traditional human rights accounts,74 the shift towards human rights occurred as the result of a complex interchange between Chileans and activists from Western and Eastern Europe. However, this human rights language was not embraced by all tendencies within Chilean exile, and even if embraced, it often piggybacked on strategic ambitions.

Armed struggle and radical political solidarity certainly continued to persist among members of the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, or the MIR, but these strategies were increasingly isolated and marginalized in the solidarity campaigns at the level of Eastern and Western European societies in the late s and s. This became especially clear when two broad divergent evolutions crystallized in the late s. The impact of Chilean exiles went beyond the level of grand doctrines of political solidarity, trade union internationalism, or human rights.

It also mattered in a more cultural way. The shift towards human rights often went hand in hand with a change in the action repertoires of solidarity movements and a growing role of cultural dimensions in solidarity. Just as recent historians have made clear the way in which South African musicians and artists in exile played a key role in shaping a transnational protest culture against apartheid and in forming a broader support movement for the ANC through music, literature, and dances,76 so were Chilean artists, filmmakers, singers, and poets important as cultural tools for political exile.

The poetry by Nobel Prize winner Pablo Neruda — who was until his death shortly after the coup one of the international icons of the Unidad Popular — was used by Chilean exiles to draw attention to the plight of their country. After the coup, the fame of the Chilean music reached its zenith, promoted by various banned music groups living in European cities like Paris and Rome from where they travelled the globe.

Inti-Illimani, which was touring Europe at the moment of the coup, headlined hundreds of concerts across Western and Eastern Europe. This was considered an exercise of resistance against Pinochet, and the artists framed those concerts as such. Western and Eastern Europeans joined the Chilean exiles after the coup by organizing and participating in demonstrations against Pinochet that brought together tens of thousands of participants.

Some of the gatherings even eclipsed in size and breadth the iconic anti-Vietnam War protests. Indeed, as Georg Dufner and Nuno Pereira assert in their respective contributions, thousands of citizens took to the streets in larger numbers than during demonstrations against the Vietnam War. The action repertoires accumulated and developed during Vietnam protest functioned often as a benchmark and source of inspiration. In his two contributions to this volume, Kim Christiaens reveals, for instance, the way that plans of action developed during campaigns against the Vietnam War were used to stage opposition against Pinochet.

Experiences and networks accumulated during the protest against the Vietnam War were re-energized in the mobilization for Chile. After September , many local Vietnam solidarity committees, whose roots often remounted to earlier initiatives in support of the Algerian National Liberation Front, transformed into committees claiming common cause with the Chilean resistance against Pinochet. One of the most striking examples of this continuity, as argued by Kim Christiaens in his contribution on Belgium, was the Second Russell Tribunal, an initiative of an international assortment of the most famous intellectuals of the New Left who formed, under the leadership of figures like the Italian senator Lelio Basso and the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, a tribunal to condemn the repression in Chile and other Latin American countries.

They followed the example of the Russell Tribunal on Vietnam formed in the late s. The variety of actors moved by Chile in European societies confirms what had been observed by the recalcitrant British sociologist Frank Parkin as early as the s, namely that foreign issues like peace abroad and the Third World were strikingly capable of bridging domestic ideological and political division lines. Traditionalist Catholic groups in Western Europe, critical of the Allende government, were keen to welcome the military coup.

However, their appetite to celebrate the junta waned quickly and their attention turned later to the more Catholic version of military dictatorship in Argentina. As Georg Dufner remarks in his contribution on West Germany, the Pinochet government could rely on support from prominent conservatives like Franz Josef Strauss, and on strategic observations and Realpolitik concerns by Christian democratic parties in governments.

The Belgian Christian democratic and social democratic coalition government, for instance, refused in September , despite all its protest against the coup, to break off diplomatic relations with Chile; diplomatic relations between Belgium and Chile did not sour until the late s, partly due to the growing state repression against re-organizing Christian trade unionists that had begun domestic protest.

But all in all, the coup in Chile provoked a shocked reaction in Christian quarters in Europe. Progressive Christian groups took a prominent role in denouncing the military junta, in some countries very soon after September The Vatican and Catholic hierarchy expressed, however, strong and early opposition against Pinochet. Furthermore, in her contribution on the British solidarity campaigns, Shirin Hirsch draws attention to the role that individuals like Sheila Cassidy could exert on the solidarity movement for Chile.

Upon her return to her home country, Cassidy — a Christian British medical doctor who had been tortured by the Chilean secret police DINA for aiding persecuted opposition members — turned into an icon of protest against Pinochet that appealed to worshippers. The Christian democratic connection in Italy and other countries was also strongly influenced by the efforts of prominent Chilean exiles. Stationed in the West German capital Bonn as a diplomat when caught by the coup, the diplomat Esteban Tomic moved to Italy along with other prominent Christian democratic leaders like former Interior Minister under the Frei administration Bernardo Leighton.

Italy at the time was led by a Christian democratic government. In the s, as Christian democrats took a prominent role in the domestic opposition against Pinochet, the support from European Christian democratic party foundations often dwarfed that of their social democratic counterparts: in the period between , for instance, the amount of money that flew from the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation to the Chilean opposition was more than the double of that from the social democratic Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Inside Chile and abroad, human rights and justice NGOs largely carried the weight of campaigns against the military dictatorship. International campaigning came from human rights organizations from both Western and Eastern Europe. Not only had the US and Western Europe — inspired by the post-war decolonization process — witnessed in the decades preceding the coup a surge of organizations shifting towards the language of human rights, but also an increasing number of organizations sponsored by the Soviet Union and Eastern European governments had emerged.

It also organized international conferences that brought hundreds of activists together in defense of human rights. All this tied in with an active human rights diplomacy over Chile pursued by the Soviet Union and its allies at the United Nations. As recently argued by human rights scholars like Kelly, this International Commission became one of the most important contributors to the international human rights campaigns over Chile.

A key element was also that these organizations formed, at least in the s, a privileged partner for Chilean political parties in exile, notably the Communist and Socialist Parties, with whom they developed a close collaboration that allowed them to make use of information, legitimacy, and avenues for action provided by the latter.

Later on, the scale of all these initiatives dwindled, something that was not only linked to the gradually decreasing salience of the issue of Chile, but also to the changing action repertoires and ideas that accompanied the shift towards human rights. This shift often narrowed the opportunities open to grassroots groups, and made action at the level of more professionalized NGOs and international organizations more meaningful. All this meant that ideas of anti-Americanism, which had since the coup strengthened leftist activists who criticized the US for its negative record on human rights issues and political repression in the Third World, lost much of their power in solidarity movements with Chile.

Instead, these ideas re-emerged and resonated more powerfully in new protest movements in the late s. Among the causes that became more attractive foci for anti-Americanism were the struggle of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, opposition to the Reagan administration, and the installation of missiles on European soil in the wake of the NATO double track decision. Also, in Western Europe, the issue of solidarity with Chile offered dwindling avenues for challenging and criticizing governments and political parties at home, since most of the European governments and politicians adopted a critical stance against the Pinochet regime.

Since the coup, European activists had provided political and moral support to the Chilean opposition by lobbying their governments to adopt a more hostile policy towards the military regime. They also pressured governments to support Chilean opposition movements financially. Indeed, many governments and party foundations such as those in Belgium, West Germany, and the Netherlands supported several NGO projects in Chile from the late s onwards. The solidarity campaigns for Chile, however, make an interesting case that elicits a reconsideration of the history of the Cold War in Europe and beyond.

The mobilization for Chile offers an interesting foothold to reflect on connections between Western and Eastern Europe in the s and s. In the wake of the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War in , historians have been increasingly interested in dismantling the image of the Iron Curtain as a barrier for contact between Western and Eastern Europe and in stressing common paths between both Europes. Several contributions to this book reveal the existence of a variety of transnational networks that connected activists in Western and Eastern Europe in common campaigns against Pinochet.

Already in the first months after the coup, efforts emerged in several cities to coordinate campaigns for Chile on a European scale. A center for the European Coordination of Information about Chile was established in Paris to amass and circulate movies and pictures among Eastern and Western European countries.

What is crucial to underline here, however, is that two non-Western European actors were of primary importance to these efforts for the Europeanization of activism, namely international communist organizations from the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain, and Chilean exile organizations.

These efforts of Soviet diplomacy had of course a long history. In the first decades after the Second World War, the policy of peaceful coexistence proclaimed by Khrushchev promoted contacts with Western European societies through public diplomacy, friendship associations, and travels. The World Peace Council, which had staged several mass conferences on peace, disarmament, and the Vietnam War in Scandinavian cities like Stockholm and Helsinki in the s, now turned to conferences in these and other European locales, which attracted delegations from Western European social democrats, communists and Christian groups around the flag of solidarity with Chile.

East-West contacts were thus not only a matter of Eastern European dissidents turning to the Western European New Left, an issue on which a number of recent studies on the movements have put emphasis, but were also sponsored and channeled by official Eastern European parties and organizations supported by the Soviet Union.

Many activists working at the local level in Western Europe were connected through their contacts with Chilean exiles with their counterparts in other countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain; they visited headquarters of Chilean exile in Rome and Paris almost as easily as those in East Berlin, Moscow or Prague.

In addition to these networks of political organizations, a transnational identity of activism and a shared imaginary were cultivated and stimulated by Chilean artists who toured across continents and seas, and contributed through their albums and concerts to the strengthening of a common protest culture spanning and linking East and West, North and South, South and South. Although at the other side of the Atlantic an important mobilization against Pinochet had been organized and connections had been built between Europeans and Americans during the protest against the Vietnam War in the s, most of the contributions to this volume have found little proof of intense contacts of European activists with their counterparts in the US.

As Kim Christiaens argues in his contribution on international labor campaigns, Western European trade unionists often stood in a strained relationship with their American counterparts of the AFL-CIO when it came to organizing solidarity with Chilean opposition. What is more striking, however, is that the mobilization for Chile, building itself on earlier campaigns for Algeria, Spain, and Vietnam, gave way to a broader movement which shifted its attention to the plight of people living under dictatorships in other parts of the Global South, such as Argentina, South Africa, and Central America.

At the same time, this shift also widened and accentuated the gulf between those sticking to the radicalism of armed struggle and those converted into principles of non-violence, democracy, and human rights. Whereas European experiences helped a substantial part of Chilean exile political parties to embrace human rights and convinced them to de-radicalize their opposition against Pinochet from armed struggle to non-violent opposition through democratic means, more radical sectors turned in the late s towards armed struggles in Latin America, most notably in Nicaragua.

The s were different than the early s, indeed, but the transnational contacts of Chilean anti-dictatorship activists endured, although in other directions. East-West contacts in the mobilization for Chile, but also for other Third World causes like Central America , were in this period limited and changed by the weight of re-emerging Cold War tensions. These tensions had an important ideological and organizational impact, both on exile activity, domestic opposition in Chile, and solidarity campaigns in Europe. The social democratic ICFTU, which had in the first years after the coup collaborated with the self-proclaimed unitary but strongly communist-influenced exile organization of the Chilean trade union movement CUT, withdrew its recognition and stopped its cooperation under influence of the American AFL-CIO, and of the division of Chilean exiles between communists and socialists loyal to armed struggle and the Soviet Union, and socialists embracing European social democracy.

The traumatic experience of Chile had an impact on European societies but the reverse was also true. Europe critically influenced the Chilean opposition against Pinochet and the transition to democracy in the s in various ways, both ideologically and organizationally. Beyond the help in terms of lobbying and financial support provided by European governments and political and social movements, European experiences shaped much of the ideological and strategic orientations of the Chilean opposition in its pursuit for the return of democracy.

At the same time, we should remain aware that the impact and resonance of the mobilization for Chile is difficult to measure quantitatively and objectively, and should be put in perspective. Many Chileans and former activists have been celebrating in retrospect the international sympathy for the Chilean opposition as exceptionally strong and widespread, notably compared to the little or sometimes virtually inexistent solidarity in Europe with dissidents fighting against military regimes in other regions of the Global South.

Yet, even if tens of thousands of European citizens stepped into action for Chile, we cannot neglect the fact that numbers are always relative. In the case of the solidarity movement for Chile, many people participated only temporarily and many more did not participate at all. Also the extent of the financial and material support which was provided to the Chilean opposition by European supporters is difficult to gauge, not only because of the lack of transparency with which this aid was often siphoned into Chile, but also because of the varied and often strongly divided nature of the Chilean opposition against Pinochet.

However, even if the mobilization for Chile retreated gradually to the offices of NGOs, political parties, and exile centers from the mids onwards and became through this process less visible, it does not mean that solidarity was less important. The reaction did not only vary and change over time, but also over space.

Whereas it may be true that some countries like France, Italy, and Sweden played a more prominent role in the mobilization due to the concentration of exiles, solidarity was even in those countries mainly emerging from some local epicenters in cities like Paris, Rome, and Stockholm. Solidarity was thus a multilevel phenomenon, which not only emerged at the level of international bodies and organizations, but was often very local. In an academic volume without much oral history, it is also difficult to gauge and describe accurately the emotions, ideals, and personal experiences that drove this mobilization.

Yet, what these pages make clear is that for many Chileans and Europeans, activism for Chile was not an ephemeral nicety, but something that profoundly changed and affected their lives. Victor Figueroa Clark, Allende. Revolutionary Democrat London, William F. Lowenthal ed. Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File. Steve J. Kornbluh, The Pinochet File. Roger Burbach, The Pinochet Affair. In Latin America itself, the number of academic and non-academic events for the commemoration of the coup was abundant.

Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U. Stephen C. International Norms and Domestic Change Cambridge [etc. A History Princeton and Woodstock, , p. Peter R. Baehr, Monique C. Thomas C. Wright, State Terrorism in Latin America. See for instance: Hans Beerends, Weg met Pinochet. La solidaridad y la comunidad chilena en Suecia. Solidariteten met Chiles folk och Chilenare i Sverige. Cile e Italia, destini incrociati Naples, See for instance: Thomas C. For an overview of older literature, see: Thomas C.

Yolanda Cieters, Chilenen in ballingschap. Central American Agency in the Creation of the U. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy and Mayer N. Zald eds , Globalisations and Social Movements. George R. Maud Anne Bracke, Which Socialism? Margaret E. Advocacy Networks in International Politics Ithaca, Wild Cards in World Politics London, Max Elbaum, Revolution in the Air. Le Temps de contestation Paris and Brussels, , p p. Tony Judt, Postwar.

A History of Europe since London, , pp. Daum, Lloyd C. Create One World. Warsaw, , p. Andrea Mulas, Allende e Berlinguer. Reynolds and other international reporters drew parallels between the military coup in Chile and the one in Egypt, in July Voices of Exile Albuquerque, Robert Bell et al. Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism Tokyo, , p. George N. Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left. Seidman, The Imaginary Revolution. The Chile Monitor.

A Bulletin of news on Chile. Theotonio Dos Santos, Socialismo o fascismo: dilema latinoamericano Santiago, Orgaan van de Belgische Socialistische Partij, 10 October , p. Winn cited in: Joseph L. Nogee and John W. Amy A. The Legacy of September 11, Brighton and Portland, , p. Martin's Press, , p. Hybridity is in fact an inescapable issue for an understanding of Catalan culture through history. In The Spaniards John. Nationalism , p. After all, Catalan writers writing in Castilian such as Francesc Candel and Jaime Gil de Biedma were among the first to offer Catalonia to immigrants coming from the south of Spain.

Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present. Jacqueline Hall. New York: St. Cahner, M. El reto europeo:Identidadesculturales en elcambio desiglo. Capmany, Maria Aurelia. Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, Diez Medrano, Juan. Hansen, Edward C. Hughes, Robert. New York: Knopf, Johnson, Hank. Tales of Nationalism: Catalonia, Laitin, D.

La Renaixenfa: Fonts per alseu estudi Samso, Joan. La cultura catalana: Ente la clandestinitat i la represa publica. Sole i Sabater, Josep Maria. Cronologia de la repressid de la llengua i la cultura catalanes Barcelona: Curiel, Yet they are usually studied with very different purposes in mind: in the case of the Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa MCC , the object of study is a world-famous industrial and banking cooperative, anxiously scrutinized by business experts from north America and Japan, much as Spaniards once admired the Altos Hornos de Vizcaya foundries, now being dismantled.

In the case of Renteria, a radical town on the outskirts of San Sebastian - the provincial capital of Gipuzkoa - with putrid river and matching atmosphere caused by a Spanish government paper factory, the story bodes well for no one. The latter is the coalition that within the new system of Spanish political parties fronts for the Basque terrorist organization.

Because the result is to bring the entire CAV - for the problem affects all of Euskadi - to the brink of chaos, even to the point where the survival of Basque nationalism itself is threatened. For what, in the early Transition, was a sentimental or patriotic attachment to the all but independent Basque Republic of the Civil War is fast becoming its outright rejection by over half the Basque citizens.

Works (3,874)

In fact, urban and rural Basques are fast becoming disenchanted with radical and conservative Basque nationalist politics, since today both seem responsible for the civil disorder caused by HB's tactics of provoke and destroy. Before Franco's death in it was possible, even customary, for foreigners to cross the French-Spanish border at Irun, visit lovely San Sebastian and head south for Madrid and Granada, without recognizing any distinctive signs of what is today known as Euskadi, an historically different region of Spain with - for its radical nationalists - inalienable aspirations to independence.

This was because of a Francoist repression so severe that virtually all signs of sub-national identity had been erased. But this effort at the homogenization of Spain's age-old differences finally backfired, for in the late s it provoked the violent reaction that today often seems close to being a matter of life and death for the new Spanish democracy. To understand the Transition in the Basque Country one must go back in history to the Restoration of the monarchy in , which laid to rest both Carlism an arch-conservative monarchist movement and Foralism historical rights which granted a distinct legal and fiscal system to the Basque Provinces and opened the Basque Country to liberalism, industrialism and Basque, instead of Spanish, nationalism.

A measure of the political ambiguity surrounding the Basque Country is symbolized by its modern lack of definition as a geo-political entity. Bordering the Bay of Biscay, it runs northeastward as far as Bayonne France and westward to Bilbao Spain , and it also extends inland some km. Thus, in theory its area is about 20, km 2 , and it would contain roughly 2.

While the actual CAV is mountainous and deceptively verdant although not particularly The Basque Country 57 fertile, the southern three-quarters of Navarra are as productively arable as the best of the Castilian meseta, Thus what nationalists would like to call Euskadi and Euskalherria is not only divided by the Pyrenees, the French-Spanish border, and the Cantabrian mountains, but also by the Basque language Euskara , the wariness of the navarros, who have twice voted not to be Basque, and by the Basque nationalists' ambiguously exclusionary politics.

It also exemplifies to perfection the modern socio-political effects of Spain's problematic unification in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a state and as a nation. That is, the failure of nation- as opposed to state- building by Spain's governments - to use Linz's distinction - that caused the tensions between center and periphery in the first place can be seen replicating itself in the recent failure of the PNV-controlled Basque autonomous community to assimilate or at least tolerate its own diverse nationalist and non-nationalist elements, so that while on the larger scale of the nation-state, the Basque Country is causing the Spanish government deep distress, within the Basque autonomous community the failure of the once hegemonic PNV to convince and assimilate all its citizens has similarly created severe civic division and political ambiguity in the CAV.

This situation has arisen because, somewhat as happened fifty years earlier in Catalonia, the patrimonial control of nationalism has passed downward from the haute bourgeoisie to the middle and professional classes. This post competition between rival nationalist groups to hold on to or appropriate essentially the same political, ethnic, and cultural symbols explains the political turmoil but equally the cultural effervescence that characterizes Euskadi today. When the struggle for identity concerns opposing interpretations of the same nationalist symbols, differences are inevitably a mere matter of emphasis.

Antonio Canovas del Castillo's law of 21 July indeed put paid to Basque foral privileges. Yet the Basque industrial bourgeoisie and Basque liberals were soon working together to wrest regional fiscal autonomy from the Spanish government in the form of Conciertos Economicos. Into the space created by the loss of Basque foral privileges and the strong sentiment attached thereto stepped Sabino Arana , the father of Basque nationalism. That both groups would eventually need to do so was inevitable. For what Sabino Arana's PNV would manage to do was transform completely the Basque region by providing it with a different and politically useful self-awareness and coherence.

The Basque Country 59 Meanwhile, in the late nineteenth century, the great Basque banking, shipping, and industrial dynasties - Chavarri, Urquijo y Ussia, Aznar, and Ibarra - began to intervene directly in Restoration politics to protect their commercial and banking interests. During the late Alfonsine monarchy, members of the Vizcayan Basque haute bourgeoisie themselves became deputies and senators through the good offices of caciquismo y as in the rest of Spain. The difference, however, was that the Basque oligarchy used caciquismo against the central government.

When universal suffrage arrived in , Basque liberals also began, infrequently, to win elections. The Socialists also made small electoral advances in Gipuzkoa - in industrial Eibar and Deva. Because of its neutrality, Spain - especially the big industrialists of Barcelona and Bilbao - reaped huge benefits from the First World War. This brought results that were reflected in the Bilbao elections of , when Mario de Arana was elected the first Nationalist mayor. Although Ramon de la Sota, son of the leading Vizcayan industrialist, was also elected President of the Vizcayan Provincial Diputacion, middle-class Nationalists now began replacing the industrial aristocracy as the leaders in local politics.

Indeed, in the Nationalists even decided to present candidates for election to the Cortes in Madrid. The Nationalist successes in Vizcaya displaced the Spanish-oriented Vizcayan Monarchists so that the latter considered a pact with the Socialist leader and prime minister Indalecio Prieto, in order to maintain a Spanish presence in Vizcaya against the Nationalist tide Garcia, Nacionalismo vasco, p. SILVER San Sebastian - and the provincial - the baserritarra tenant farmer and the arrantzale commercial fisherman as heroic icons, the modernized baserri family farmhouse as a symbol of inter-class communitarianism.

This is why artists were soon depicting the traditional baserri as a white-washed exterior and a red-tiled roof, set atop a bright green knoll - incidentally replicating the colors of the ikurina or Basque National ist flag. Of course, the real baserri and its often abject inhabitants were traditionally Spanish monarchists and later Carlists, only becoming Basque Nationalists in the s and s. The farmhouses in which these Basque tenant farmers lived were rarely whitewashed and frequently so smoke-filled that humans and animals cohabited in unpleasantly fetid conditions.

From such sentimental and ideological beginnings it was a small step to the architectural promotion of this imaginary Basque farmhouse as prototype for the first and second homes of the upper middle-class Basques. That is, the ideological connotations of the baserri became part of the conservative Nationalist idiom that stood opposed, according to Imanol Agirre, to both the international and the modernist styles.

But Euskara, unlike Catalan, had a sparse written, and virtually no secular literary, tradition, being primarily spoken in modern times by farmers and rural clergy, and rarely in the liberal urban centers of Bilbao and San Sebastian. Thus it was indeed the genuine patrimony of the farmer or recent immigrant to the city, and a vehicle for a rich oral culture. Sabino Arana had avoided this designation because it excluded Basques like himself who had been deprived of their native language and must learn it.

He preferred the names Vasconia, Euskeria, Bizkaia, and finally Euzkadi, for the Basque nation, which were political rather than restric- tively linguistic in nature. SILVER If we realize that between and martial law was declared in all of Spain four times, but also an additional seven times solely in the Basque Country, it is easier to imagine the police repression that was visited on native Basques and new immigrants alike.

However, once the democratic Transition began, and the Basque Nationalist Party realized how much it had to gain by working within the extremely generous new democratic system, the extra-establishment radical Basque movement was forced to develop a distinct nationalist coloration of its own. This featured a new anti-colonial version of Arana's virulent anti-Spain posture, and an insistence that the Basque language and the Basque nation were consubstantial, which automatically excluded the majority of the population that spoke little or no Euskara.

Unfortunately, since neither the PNV nor EA can bring themselves unequivocally to renounce the notion of independence from Spain, they cannot escape association in the minds of Basque non-nationalists with an ETA terrorism that today is also directed against the Basque Country itself - including the newly commissioned Basque police.

This is why Basque nationalism, both conservative and Marxist-Leninist, has been forced to make way first before a large Socialist vote, and more recently before a significant vote for the Partido Popular, which narrowly defeated the Socialists in the national elections of Despite the ETA violence that the Basque Country shares with the Spanish state, and its own civic disorder generated by the juvenile cadres ofHB in Bilbao, San Sebastian, and Vitoria, Euskadi remains the center of The Basque Country 63 a genuine and far-reaching cultural ferment that is exceptional in Spain.

Basque sculpture is also noteworthy and is dominated by Eduardo Chillida, Jorge de Oteiza, Agustin Ibarrola, and Andres Nagel, all of international reputation. But in Euskadi, where a Basque cantautor can be threatened by ETA followers for singing in Castilian, xenophobia can have tragic consequences. However, instead of continuing to surpass himself, Atxaga has since written two quite different novels - El hombre solo Man Alone, and Esos cielos Those Skies, Both deal with the militant sub-culture surrounding ETA, and while they have been well received in Spain and abroad, neither garnered the rave notices of his first major success.

Moreover, by contrast with his profound and whimsical Obabakoak, his latest novels seem less, rather than more, weighted with the resistance of daily life. The area which constitutes the Basque Country is disputed; some observers include the Navarra region, others do not.

See Mikel Azurmendi, Nombrar, embrujar? I am especially indebted to Professor Azurmendi for his comments on the present essay. Luis C. La heridapatriotica. Corcuera Atienza, Javier. Origenes, ideologiay organizacidn del nacionalismo vasco, Madrid: Siglo xxi, Fusi, Juan Pablo. El Pais Vasco. Pluralismoy nacionalidad. Madrid: Alianza, Garda de Cortazar, Fernando. El nacionalismo vasco. Madrid: Historia 16, Juaresti, Jon. El linaje deAitor. La invencidn de la tradicidn vasca.

El bucle melancdlico. Historias deNacionalistas Vascos. Madrid: Espasa - Calpe, Martinez Gorriaran, Carlos, and Imanol Agirre. Estttica de la diferencia. Jose Alvarez Junco 5 History, politics, and culture, The so-called Restoration of did not exactly restore the situation of any former regime. Politically, the troubles which had characterized not only the rule of Isabel II but the whole of the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, reaching a climax during the revolutionary period, came to an end.

The former were granted freedom to associate, to publish their own newspapers and to compete in elections, on the implicit understanding that one day they would have access to power. The latter had to endure a 68 jose Alvarez junco harsh repression, albeit one never comparable to the dictatorial periods the country had suffered earlier in the centuiy.

This basically applied to the Carl is ts and Republicans, although exceptions were made for the most moderate elements, such as the former Republican president Emilio Castelar, whose marked evolution towards conservatism made him an asset, and not a liability, for the system. They were in power for only two years, hardly enough time for them to do anything but remove some of the press censorship and the limits imposed on the freedom of association.

Their success 60, members in two years exceeded what the ruling block was ready to tolerate.

The FTRE disappeared after a few years of constant crisis and mutual recriminations among its leaders and some of its militants formed a meager anarchist organization, linked to terrorist groups in the following decade. History, politics, and culture, 69 By , after a brief transition government, Canovas was again prime minister. By then, the internal problems seemed to have been overcome and the government could devote some time to foreign policy. King Alfonso XII went on a European trip where he made some gestures of friendship towards the Germans, which annoyed the French; but immediately afterwards Spain clashed with Germany over the Caroline Islands, an archipelago in the Pacific which had long been part of the Spanish empire but had been scarcely colonized by the Spaniards and was now coveted by the Germans.

These rivalries and skirmishes were normal among European powers of the period, but political instability had made the Spaniards unable to compete in this field for many decades. Now, it seemed that Spanish embassies and consulates could report on national interests and colonial expansion instead of devoting all their efforts to following the movements of Don Carlos, the pretender to the throne, and Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla, the Republican conspirator.

The frailty of the new regime, in spite of this seeming strength, was made apparent when in November the young king Alfonso XII died of tuberculosis. The whole system, so laboriously built up by Canovas over ten years, threatened to collapse. Canovas quickly understood that the only way to strengthen the monarchy was to give a real opportunity to his moderate Liberal opponent, Sagasta. He was christened Alfonso XIII and was declared king from his very first moment of life, although Maria Cristina would remain as regent until he reached his sixteenth birthday.

However, the problems did not stop there. The child was frail and sickly, and peri-natal mortality rates were extremely high at that time. The truth was that the Carlists had been unable to reorganize after their military defeat of , in spite of the constant conspiratorial activities of Don Carlos, and many of them had been co-opted by Canovas into his Conservative Party through the Union Catolica led by the Marques de Pidal. Alfonso XIlTs birth lent an air of urgency to their activities and in the summer of General Villacampa raised the Republican banner once more.

Having secured his position, Sagasta could then devote his efforts to the implementation of the ambitious program of reforms he had announced when he formed the government: religious and educational liberties, freedom of expression and association, universal male suffrage, trial by jury, military reforms, abolition of slavery in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and the codification of the civil law.

In spite of considerable difficulties, throughout the following five years most of these reforms were approved, even though in many cases diluted. By the end of his five-year period of government, in , Sagasta felt so secure that he dared to press for the approval of the long-promised and always delayed law of universal male suffrage. One wonders about the real aim of this measure. No parliamentary monarchy at the time had such an extensive participatory system, and nobody demanded it in Spain, apart from a few former revolutionaries of , who had been reduced to impotence for the last fifteen years.

If we want to summarize its traits today, we could define it as a non-competitive oligarchical monarchy. Yet if we cannot compare the system to Tsarist Russia, neither can we say that it was a constitutional parliamentary monarchy similar to the British one, in spite of its apologists" claims, because universal suffrage simply did not exist, and changes in government, rather than the result of electoral results always favorable to the ruling party , were dependent on the royal will.


  • The item has been added to your basket!
  • Antonio Llidó, un sacerdote revolucionario by AMORÓS, MARIO: - Rayo de la Tormenta.
  • Antonio Llidó - Alchetron, The Free Social Encyclopedia.
  • Things You Might See: A Rhyming Picture Book for Kids Learning to Read!

Furthermore, this political system was only the upper part of an administration that was formally centralized, but actually devoid of resources, which meant that the implementation of its directives required pacts with local elites. This was the origin of caciquismo after the Caribbean word cacique, meaning an Indian chieftain, which was applied to local political bosses , a widespread phenomenon which dominated local politics. The fragmentation of political power did not merely encompass local differences or a gap between the cities and the countryside, both of them traditional Spanish realities.

The new phenomenon was the emergence of large cities, which for the first time in the modern era rivaled Madrid for the creation of new political spaces, using old cultural differences wrapped up in the new nationalist rhetoric. In the s, while Madrid was still much more a large provincial town than a European capital, 3 Barcelona was living through a hectic textile boom based on its dominion over the Cuban market, which would accumulate enough capital to transform the city into one of the most beautiful art nouveau milieus in Europe.

Antonio Llidó Mengual

Understandably, Catalan intellectuals, artists, politicians and entrepreneurs despised Madrid and considered Paris their natural pole of attraction, their model for modernity. Something similar, although slightly different, was beginning to happen in Bilbao province, in the Basque Country, where an accelerated industrial take-off that had begun 7 2 jose Alvarez junco just after the end of the last Carlist War was making the city boom from 30, inhabitants to , in thirty years.

In this case, though, even if financiers and entrepreneurs had established close links with England, the most important Basque intellectuals Unamuno, Baroja, Maeztu would still consider Madrid their natural center for several decades. These new urban and industrial centers not only fostered new elites, ready to challenge the traditional Madrid rulership, but also gave rise to new political and social conflicts to which the central government had no response.

This explains why, in spite of what the new universal suffrage law seemed to presage, the paramount concerns of the s were not going to be those which had hitherto dominated the century - i. Tension decreased after the first three celebrations. May Day quickly became a mere festivity, a proof of existence, and a show of strength by a new political actor, whose threat was fairly remote.

The Canovist monarchy faced these problems without much concern. The assassination of the prime minister and architect of the regime, Antonio Canovas del Castillo, by the Italian anarchist Michele Angiolillo in August was met with relative calm and a surprising sense of normality, given the drama of the moment.

The Cuban War, begun in February , was indeed the gravest of all immediate political problems in the s. Instead of being punished, the army pressed the government for control of the press, and this pressure led to nothing less than a ministerial crisis. The event foretold the beginnings of a new phase of military interventionism in political life. But the significance of the Cuban War, and later the Span- ish-American War, was due to other circumstances, many of them of a cultural kind, which are difficult to understand from our perspective.

From then on, all the rhetoric about imperial grandeur was empty. What the defeat did was to expose that rhetoric for what it was. The crisis neither provoked a severe economic recession nor put the monarchy in serious jeopardy. From an economic point of view, the textile sector was the most damaged, and then only for a few years.

Neither was 74 jose Alvarez junco there any cataclysm in the political sphere. The Spanish monarchy did not face any serious threat and in fact only eight years later, after Alfonso came of age and was married to a grand-daughter of Queen Victoria, it was more stable than at any time in the recent past. The problems faced by Alfonso XIII in the later part of his reign had nothing to do with the last years of the regency.

Antonio Llidó - Wikiquote

And yet, if there was no real crisis, there was a very acute consciousness of crisis. There were three aspects of this disaster: from one point of view, it affected existing political institutions; from another, it concerned the ruling elites; and, finally, it had to do with the ideology or the rhetoric which legitimized the Spanish state. The danger of this discourse would be apparent when used by Primo de Rivera or Franco, who used anti-caciquismo rhetoric for the elimination of the whole liberal parliamentary system. The second aspect of the crisis was the loss of prestige of the elites, not only the political and military elites, but also the socio-economic: the clergy, blamed for the loss of the Philippines; the aristocrats and the land- owners, who had managed to exclude their offspring from the fight for the fatherland.

The crisis, though, did not lead to any significant renewal in this aspect either. Silvela and Maura, products of the system, succeeded Canovas. Sagasta himself, head of the government at the time of the War, went on presiding over governments until the moment of his death, in , only to be succeeded by his immediate aide. The same political rulers would thus continue in power, more and more remote from public opinion, until Primo de Rivera removed them completely.

Finally, the crisis had an ideological aspect, of such an intensity that we could call it "metaphysical. The loss of the remaining Spanish colonies happened just when the great European powers - among which Spaniards naturally included themselves - were carving up the world, and their victories or defeats were interpreted in terms of racial and national superiority or inferiority.

The meaning of these wars was utterly different from those of the eighteenth century, when autocratic monarchs forced their populations into their armies and waged wars which led to the expansion or the diminution of the king's territories. The basic tenets of the patriotic rhetoric constructed throughout the nineteenth century were thus shaken to the core. A rhetoric which mixed positive and negative qualities, in its description of the national soul or character, but which in the end led to national pride, was based on the supposed readiness of Spaniards to sacrifice their lives for their fatherland and their identity - which made them invincible, as proven at the time of the Napoleonic invasion.

Understandably, it was at this point that peripheral nationalisms, above all Catalanism, reached the stage of massive political movements. Confronted with national decadence and failure, the Conservative leader put forward a technocratic-authoritarian program: the rebuilding of the navy, new incentives for national industry, limited administrative decentralization, reform of the suffrage towards corporatist forms instead of broadening its base, but at the same time more respect for authentic popular suffrage; and everything within a strict respect for law and order and the maintenance of traditional ties between the church and state.

Canalejas signified almost the exact opposite to Maura within the dynastic regime: he incorporated some of the ingredients of anti-clerical rhetoric, in an effort to win popular support for his projected modernization of the administration. But very soon labor problems emerged and Canalejas made a military response to the strikes, as his French counterpart Clemenceau had recently done. This authoritarian response led to his immediate unpopularity among the left, and in the end to his assassination by another anarchist, in History, politics, and culture, This meant the disappearance of the two statesmen who, from the right and the left of the political spectrum loyal to the constitutional monarchy established in , had a certain authority and credibility.

Frustration mounted, in the same measure as the possibility of regenerating the system diminished. Yet the demolition of the system created by Canovas was not going to be easy. It would still take a long and complex crisis, developed over another ten years, until General Primo de Rivera staged his coup in No ideological differences can be established among these factions, which were merely divided by personal loyalties. Confronted by the First World War , the great event of these years, Spain remained neutral. Some of the most outspoken and bellicose aliadofilos were led not so much by ideological affinities with France and England but rather by the feeling that Spain had to overcome its isolation and irrelevance in the international arena, as well as by the need to infuse strong patriotic feelings among the Spanish masses.

Furthermore, neutrality proved to be very profitable for the Spanish economy. Exports boomed, and the trade balance was positive for four consecutive years, the only time in the whole modern history of Spain. It was a particularly complex conflict, in which three processes co-existed. On the one hand were the defenders of seniority, traditional in the Spanish infantry, which stood as a guarantee against political favoritism.

This debate was demagogically mixed by the leader of the Juntas de Defensa, Colonel Marquez, with the dominant regenerationist discourse. The inability of the government to subdue the Juntas provoked several crises and finally put an end to the period of Liberal rule. The second crisis of the summer of affected the parliament. Radical Republicans, the rivals of the Catalan nationalists, decided to accept the offer, and so did the Republicans and some Liberal factions.

The government chose to allow the meeting, although explicitly stating that no parliamentary resolutions of value should be taken. Amid high expectations and extraordinary precautions, the meeting was held in July The strike was so ill-timed that it was suspected to have been provoked by the government History, politics, and culture, 79 in order to make it fail, and to defeat the two other opposition movements at the same time.

Once again, the army took up the role of supreme guardian of law and order, and repressed the strike in such a vicious way that it left nearly one hundred dead. The Dato government, criticized by everybody, was forced to resign. The Liberal and the Conservative choices had been exhausted, resulting in the formation - for the first time - of a coalition government.

A new hope seemed to be raised, but once again the problems the rulers had to face were different from those expected - not constitutional arrangements but a wave of labor conflicts of an intensity hitherto unknown. The general strike had not been an isolated incident, but the signal of a new wave of social conflicts, whose origins were linked to the inflation created by the First World War.

Two Liberal governments followed, in , and 8 o jose Alvarez junco several conservative ones in , after which the Liberals returned for a last time in Whatever their label, all of them were made up of coalitions from different factions and parties, the Conservatives always trying to include the Catalanists, and the Liberals leaning towards the moderate Republicans of the Reformist Party.

In spite of constant political instability, the legislative work of this period was not negligible, as is proven by the approval of the Bank of Spain statute, the creation of the Ministry of Labor which promoted labor regulation , the Law of Civil Servants which protected against arbitrary firing of workers belonging to opposition parties , and major fiscal reforms. But to public eyes the image of those years was basically negative, dominated by the stereotype of inefficiency and endless political in-fighting.

One of the goals of General Miguel Primo de Rivera, when staging his coup in September , was precisely to prevent the Cortes from hearing the conclusions of the Commission on Responsibilities. This attitude reveals the lack of a well-rooted democratic culture in Spain, in spite of long periods of constitutional History, politics, and culture, rule. But one should recall also that these were times of strong anti-liberal winds all over Europe, under the widespread seduction of the fascist and Bolshevik models. His success led him to think of continuing indefinitely in power, but he then revealed his limited political abilities.

The single party he created, the Union Patriotica, did not even belong to the new model of mobilizing the populace invented by Mussolini; it was just a conservative coalition, very soon dominated by the old caciques which Primo had sworn to eliminate. His national assembly, appointed rather than elected, was not even capable of reaching an agreement on the constitutional project they were supposed to write. By , Primo de Rivera had to face problems with his own military comrades, the artillery officers in open rebellion against his projected reform of the promotion system.

And indeed the Republic came easily: after one year of doubts about how to restore the constitutional regime without endangering the monarchy, the Second Republic was voted in on 12 April It would be erroneous, though, to conclude that there was strong social support for the Republic, even if millions of people went on to the streets to celebrate its arrival. Furthermore, too many hopes were placed on the new regime. The Republicans themselves were divided regarding the depth of the proposed reforms as well as regarding crucial aspects of the organization of the state in charge of those reforms e.

Another sector which became rapidly estranged from the Republic was Catholic opinion. First of all, the monarchists and the traditional right, represented by Cardinal Segura, opposed the new regime from the very first moment something which provoked a general burning of churches in May Later on, this opposition was joined by liberal Catholics such as Miguel Maura and Niceto Alcala Zamora, ministers in the provisional government who resigned during the constitutional debate when their moderate proposals of separation between church and state were defeated by the Jacobin atmosphere which imposed articles such as the expulsion of the Jesuits.

Their most patent failure had been agrarian reform, approved after many difficulties. But the lack of resources allotted to it and the many legal guarantees created for the landowners made it a painfully slow tool for social change. The immediate problem was that none of these parties had a sufficient majority to rule on their own. Alcala Zamora, fearful of the reactions against Gil Robles, considered by many the leader-to-be of Spanish fascism, appointed Lerroux as prime minister.

The new government devoted the first half of to dismantling the strength of the unions, particularly in the countryside. The left considered this equivalent to the accession of fascism to power and called a general strike, which in Spain at that time amounted to an insurrection. The gravest events occurred in Asturias, where the miners rebelled and controlled the region for two weeks, killing priests and burning churches. The Asturian insurrection was considered a prelude to the Civil War, 84 jose Alvarez junco particularly by the right, who from then on relied only on the army as the last guarantor of the established order.

The left, on the other hand, only learned from the events of October the need to be united, and steps were taken to bring the disparate Republican groups together; they then reached out to the Socialists. The moderate president of the Republic, Alcala Zamora, was dismissed, and Manuel Azana was elected instead, a move which relegated the most able politician of the left to an honorary position.

Azana offered the prime ministership to Indalecio Prieto, no doubt the best remaining option, but internal rivalries within the Socialist Party vetoed him. In the meantime, chaos reigned in the streets. On 18 July , the military finally rebelled, a move which was not new in modern Spanish history. Robert A. Historiadeuna capital Madrid: Fundacion Caja Madrid, History, politics, and culture, 85 4.

El emperador delparalelo: Lerrouxy la demagogiapopulista. La ideologiapolitica del anarquismo espanol, Espadas Burgos, Manuel. Madrid: CSIC, Jover Zamora, Jose Maria. Politica, diplomaciay humanismopopular. Madrid: Turner, Martinez Cuadrado, Miguel. La burguesiaconservadora, Piqueras Arenas, J. La revolucion democrdtica, Ringrose, David R. Shubert, Adrian. Villacorta Banos, F. Burguesiay cultura. Los intelectuales espaholes en la sociedad liberal Boyd 6 History, politics, and culture, The Spanish Civil War of was fought along the multiple lines of cleavage - of class, ideology, and region - that had been opened by the processes of economic, social, and political modernization over the previous century.

Yet despite its complex origins and internal dynamics, participants, commentators, and historians, then and since, have tended to reduce the war to a set of simple oppositions: democracy vs. This dichotomizing tendency was perhaps inevitable in a war in which propaganda played such an important role, but it was also a consequence of a growing habit of mind among educated Spaniards to conceptualize their society in terms of the "two Spains.

As they fought over the meaning of the past and the shape of the future, Spaniards became acutely aware of the role of education in maintaining or transforming the existing order - that is, they became sensitized to the link between politics and culture. The inclination to resort to binary thinking and to cast social and History, politics, and culture, 87 political conflict in terms of contested national identity reached its climax during the five turbulentyears of the Second Republic Not surprisingly, reform of the school system - including closure of the schools of the religious orders - provoked some of the most intense debate.

Dichotomizing rhetoric about national values exacerbated political polarization, imposed a conceptual strait-jacket that limited political flexibility, and disguised the internal fissures that cut across the imaginary dyad of the two Spains. By Spaniards on each side of the rhetorical divide had come to view the other as an illegitimate usurper of the national will. As the center-left prepared to resume the program of Republican reform, right-wing paramilitary groups fought in the streets with militant workers, and radicalized peasants began seizing the land on which they worked.

Meanwhile, right-wing military conspirators and their civilian backers prepared to seize the state. On 17 July , the conspirators rose against the Popular Front government. The immediate purpose of the rising was to replace the government with a military dictatorship that would impose order and check the renewed threat of social reform.

Involving no more than 1, middle-ranking and junior officers, the revolt was initially successful in only a third of the peninsular garrisons and in northern Morocco. Three days later, the failure of the coup in many of the major cities including the two largest, Madrid and Barcelona was guaranteed by the decision of the government to defend itself against the military rebels by arming leftist political and labor organizations.

These events in turn triggered a spontaneous social revolution that spread rapidly through the areas still under Republican control. Abandoning their hopes for an easy victory, the insurgents organized their dispersed forces for a war of conquest. An immediate obstacle was the allegiance of the air force and navy to the Republican government.

BOYD 5. Espana, Civil War poster appealed to the German and Italian governments, which responded with pilots and airplanes. It continued to play a key role thereafter, not only shaping the military conflict, but also drawing the Spanish War into the tense international climate of the s.

Within a few weeks, the national territory of Spain was partitioned into two spheres of control. Profiting from the element of surprise, they also gained an unexpected foothold in the latifundia provinces of Andalusia, as well as in a few industrial cities with a militant working class, such as Zaragoza and Oviedo.

In the Republican zone, the defining event in this process was the spontaneous popular revolution unleashed by the military rebellion. More constructively, one million industrial workers and three-quarters of a million peasants took over ownership and management of the means of production, especially in areas remote from the actual fighting, like Barcelona, where representatives of the working-class parties and unions challenged the authority of both the regional and central governments.

Leftist militias, in the meantime, departed for the front, where they held the line against the advancing Nationalist armies while the government struggled to reconstitute its shattered armed forces. The struggle for power during the fall and winter of eroded Republican unity and prevented the government from articulating a coherent political message.

This competition, which was both political and cultural, undermined morale and posed insurmountable roadblocks to the formation of a coherent military strategy. BOYD During the first months of the war, cultural initiatives by leftist parties and unions proliferated. Fighting to establish its authority, the government countered with its own campaign to mobilize the people through the provision of culture.

The ministry also enacted legislation establishing a state educational monopoly while expanding access to primary and secondary schooling. But internal dissension continued to impair the unity of the Republican zone. By exploiting middle-class opposition to collectivization and by arguing that the revolution threatened both the war effort and the diplomatic campaign to secure foreign aid from the capitalist democracies of the west, the Communists managed to halt and, eventually, to reverse a revolutionary process whose decentralized and democratic character was incompatible with Stalinist theory and practice.

Popular revolution was thus suppressed in the name of the survival of popular democracy. What is clear, however, is that the Communist ascendancy gave an important propaganda tool to the anti-Republican forces by allowing them to pose as the defenders of national integrity against a Judeo- Masonic-Marxist conspiracy bent on its destruction.

The investment of all political and mili- History, politics, and culture, tary authority in a general who would brook no rivals, the imposition of military discipline on civilians and military alike, and the overriding commitment to a common objective made possible the coordination and control of the disparate groups within the Nationalist coalition. United in opposition to the reformism of the Republic, these groups were otherwise divided by class, ideology, and political goals. During the Republic they had cloaked self-interest with high-minded rhetorical defense of religion, property, and national tradition in order to court the support of the conservative middle classes.

On the other hand, the Spanish Falange, like other European fascist parties in the interwar period, was as unrelenting in its condemnation of monarchism, conservatism, and capitalism as it was of liberalism and socialism. What held these groups together was their common opposition to the democratic reformism of the Second Republic. With the prolongation of the war, the need for greater political organization and ideological coherence became imperative.

BOYD political recruits for the new regime. Falangist militarism and nationalism set the ideological tone of the New State during the war and immediate post-war years, when FET membership reached its peak of ,; public ceremonies and public spaces were dominated by its blue-shirted uniforms, parades, salutes, and oratory, which invoked the discipline, nationalism, and sacrifice of its fallen leader, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera.

Military chaplains were officially attached to army units, and religious ceremonies became a salient feature of public and private life in the Nationalist zone. Spanish fascism will be In the Nationalist zone. By the end of the war, up to 30 percent of the primary school teaching corps had been dismissed, transferred or demoted; those who survived the purge were subjected to retraining in the principles of National Catholicism.

Despite this early attention to the ideological purification of primary schooling, however, the Francoist regime in the two decades that followed the Civil War invested little money or attention in elementary education. In September , secondary education was restructured along elitist, Catholic, and authoritarian lines. A decree of placed the National Catholic imprint on higher education as well.

During the war the number of civilians executed by the Nationalists equaled the number of victims of the Red Terror in the Republican zone. By the end of the year political prisoners officially numbered , The following year a Law for the Suppression of Masonry and Communism extended the definition of political crimes to include sympathy for doctrines that Franco and his allies deemed incompatible with national values.

Franco himself, were buried. By industrial and agricultural production had fallen 20 to 30 percent below pre-war levels, but recovery was stymied by the post-war policy of economic autarky. Predicting industrial self-sufficiency within ten years, the Francoist state sharply curtailed imports, restricted the investment of foreign capital in domestic enterprises, and subsidized capital industries like railroads, steel, chemicals, and shipbuilding through the National Institute of Industry INI , a state-owned holding and investment company.

Protected from foreign competition and unable to acquire capital, resources, and equipment at competitive prices from abroad, Spanish industries produced goods inefficiently and expensively. The resulting shortages and inflation spawned a massive black market that allocated scarce resources to those with cash, extra ration coupons, and connections - commodities reserved for the victors. BOYD the fate of those defeated in the Civil War and even of many who had fought for the Nationalists, especially in the impoverished countryside.

Through the vertical syndicates, the state controlled the labor market, set wages, and imposed work rules favorable to capital: strikes, independent bargaining, and walk-outs were illegal. In the immediate post-war period , malnutrition, low infant birth weights, and disease led to at least , excess deaths over the mortality rate. Autarky in s Spain was not only economic, but also cultural. The ultimate goal of the regime was to halt and, eventually, to reverse social and cultural modernization by extirpating the sources of contamination at home and preventing their further penetration from abroad.

In Catalonia and the Basque Provinces, the autonomy statutes granted by the Republic were rescinded and public use of Catalan and Basque was proscribed. The church and the Seccion Feminina shared responsibility for socializing women in the traditional virtues of piety, self-sacrifice, humility, and above all, chastity. But in a society where imprisonment or forced unemployment of the head of the household sentenced thousands of working-class families to desperate poverty, this law was not only hypocritical, but impossible to enforce.

Nevertheless, the attempt to isolate Span- History, politics, and culture, ish society from the outside world and to resuscitate archaic social values and behaviors was generally successful, not least because they seemed to satisfy a widespread longing for order and authority among the Spanish middle classes. The economic independence sought by Franco was compromised by the financial obligations the Nationalists had contracted during the Civil War with their chief allies, Italy and Germany. Hitler, in particular, insisted on full repayment, primarily through mining concessions awarded to German companies.

Hitler still rejected the terms that Franco set for full belligerence, and with the defeat of the German armies at Stalingrad the next winter, the moment for Spanish intervention passed. From mid onward. Franco began to modify his diplomacy, if not his sympathies, a shift encouraged by the growing discontent of civilian and military monarchists angered by his refusal to relinquish power to the heir to the throne, Don Juan de Borbon. This provision, which breached the historic rules of dynastic succession and also the principle of popular sovereignty, was condemned by both exiled pretenders to the throne.

Although Francos deferral of the monarchist question pleased the anti-monarchist Falange, it did not signify the Movement's victory over its rivals within the Francoist coalition. The reward for this courtship was the Concordat with the Vatican, which lent international legitimization to the Francoist dictatorship. Hoping to isolate and weaken the dictator, the Allies recalled ambassadors, excluded Spain from the United Nations, and disqualified the regime from receiving aid under the Marshall Plan.

In the meantime. Ultimately, the Franco regime owed its survival to mounting Cold War tensions. Significant economic liberalization, however, did not begin until the late s, when technocrats affiliated with Opus Dei gained control over key ministries in the cabinet. To be sure, economic development and prosperity were not evenly distributed. Wages were still lower and the working week longer than in the rest of Europe. Hindered by lack of capital and inefficient land tenure patterns, agriculture continued to stagnate, although the chronic unemployment of landless peasants in the latifundia regions of Andalusia 10O CAROLYN P.

BOYD was finally resolved through massive emigration to western Europe and to urban centers in northern Spain. Illiteracy was essentially eradicated by , but access to secondary and higher education still differed widely by class and place of residence. The increase in livingstandards was accompanied by the emergence of a mass consumer culture whose principal commodities were television, film, and football.

Continuing abridgment of academic and cultural freedom provoked student unrest and nourished an alternative culture of protest and contestation. Reflecting internal tensions within the governing coalition divided into immobilists and liberalizers , the regime responded schizophren- ically to this growing ferment. Repression of political dissent continued - most vigorously, in Euskadi, where relentless pursuit of the Basque nationalist terrorist organization, ETA, created a receptive climate for the emergence of a more broadly based Basque nationalist movement.

On the other hand, the regime made minor concessions intended to appease mounting demands for liberalization. Shortly thereafter, new laws extended freedom of worship, authorized linguistic and cultural expression in peninsular languages other than Castilian, and relaxed state censorship. Predictably, these concessions only clarified the absence of real political self-determination and thus heightened, rather than diminished, the tensions in Spanish society. As Franco advanced in age he turned seventy in , the question of how to guarantee the continuity of the regime acquired new urgency.

Educated in Spain under the watchful eye of the Caudillo since age ten, Juan Carlos swore allegiance to Franco and the Movement in July , thus disappointing the liberal supporters of his father, as well as Carlists and anti-monarchist Falangists. The official selection of Juan Carlos represented a victory for Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the vice- president of the government and an opponent of liberalization, and for the Opus technocrats, who were indifferent, when not hostile, to political reformism.

Franco, weakened by phlebitis in and in severe decline from mid- onward, resisted to the end any meaningful democratization of the state. In spite of- not because of - the Francoist dictatorship, broad segments of Spanish society in were eager to accept the rules of democratic political life, including acceptance of the principle of a loyal opposition and of honest disagreement about political means and ends.

Estimates of the number of civilians executed by the Nationalist forces during and after the Civil War vary widely. Using the calculations of the pro-Franco military historians, Ramon and Jesus Salas Larrazabal, Payne has estimated Nationalist executions at 70,, from to Other historians have placed the figures as high as , Stanley G. La vida cotidiana en Espana bajo el regimen de Franco. Barcelona: Editorial Arcos Vergara, Alpert, Michael.

Basingstoke: Macmillan, History, politics, and culture, Boyd, Carolyn P. Princeton, N J. Carr, Raymond. The Civil War in Spain. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Carr, Raymond and Juan Pablo Fusi. Spain: Dictatorship toDemocracy. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ell wood, Sheelagh. London: Macmillan, Esenwein, George and Adrian Shubert. New York: Longman, Jackson, Gabriel. The Span ish Republic and the Civil War, Lannon, F ranees. New York: Oxford University Press, Nash, Mary. Denver, CO: Arden Press, Payne, Stanley G. TheFranco Regime, Franco: A Biography.

New York: Harper Collins, The Spanish Civil War, A Social History of Modern Spain. Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish Civil War. New York: Harper and Row, Even though the level of political violence in Spain since had been significantly lower than in other European countries, the dramatic experience of the Civil War had contributed to this image of backwardness, lack of civic culture, extremism, passion and cruelty.

They did not. None of those contradictory visions - of an outbreak of violence and of fear of freedom - had taken into account the profound change that had come over Spanish political culture after , when the first generation of university intellectuals who had not participated in the war first made their mark on public life.

admin